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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken by Plaintiff and Appellant Branson G. Neff ("Appellant" or 
"Branson") from orders and judgments of the First Judicial District Court. Thus, the 
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-
102(3)Q). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)G) ("The Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction . . . over . . . orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which 
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction."). Additionally, in its 
November 13, 2008 Order, the supreme court elected to retain this appeal. See 
November 13, 2008 Order, on file with the Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Branson raises the following three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court 
erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") with respect to the 
Jury's special verdict, specifically awarding Branson his attorney fees as special damages 
for his successful slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Defendant 
and Appellee Marvin G. Neff ("Appellee" or "Marvin"); (2) whether, in light of the trial 
court's error regarding the first issue, the trial court erred in declining to award Branson 
the attorney fees expressly awarded to him by the Jury as special damages for his 
successful slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Marvin; and (3) 
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Branson on his 
malicious prosecution cause of action against Marvin. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for each of the three issues before this Court is the same. 
Specifically, the Appellate Court Utah reviews the trial court's rulings at issue in this 
appeal for correctness, viewing all facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to Branson, and affording the trial court no deference. See, e.g., Walker v. 
Parish Chem. Co., 914 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah 1996) (elucidating standard of review 
regarding grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict); see also, e.g., Jensen v. 
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, Tf 127, 130 P.3d 325 (stating standard of review for awards of 
attorney fees); Keith Jorgensen 's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, f 11, 
26 P.3d 872 (same); see also, e.g., Nu-Med USA, Inc. v. 4Life Research, L.C., 2008 UT 
50, Tf 5, 190 P.3d 1264 (reiterating standard of review on grant of summary judgment). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
The issues at bar were preserved below by Branson's memoranda and oral 
arguments relating to the trial court's rulings and orders under review. For instance, 
Branson preserved the issues on appeal by raising them in the following papers: 
First and Second Issues: (1) February 9, 2007 Plaintiff Branson G. Neff s Motion 
for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs; (2) February 9, 2007 Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs; (3) February 9, 
2007 Affidavit of James E. Magleby in Support of Jury's Award of Attorney Fees and 
Costs; (4) March 26, 2007 Reply Memorandum in Support of Branson's Motion for Entry 
of Judgment of Attorney Fees and Costs; (5) March 26, 2007 Supplemental Affidavit of 
James E. Magleby in Support of Jury's Award of Attorney Fees and Costs; (6) March 26, 
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2007 Affidavit of Jefferson W. Gross; and (7) March 26, 2007 Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict. See R. 9796-10184, 10295-328, 
10343-77, 10386-535, & 10378-85. 
Third Issue: (1) September 14, 2006 Opposition to Marvin G. Neff s Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Malicious Prosecution, Defamation/False Light, Invasion of 
Privacy, and Slander of Title Claims; and (2) December 7, 2006 Supplemental 
Memorandum Regarding Aspen Springs and Malicious Prosecution Issues. See R. 7930-
8059 & 8618-48. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
With respect to the first and second issues - the "JNOV Ruling" and the resulting 
refusal by the trial court to follow the Jury's special verdict, specifically awarding 
Branson his attorney fees, respectively - the determinative rule is Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 51, which reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
(a) Preliminary instructions. After the jury is sworn and before opening 
statements, the court may instruct the jury concerning the jurors' duties and 
conduct, the order of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the 
cause of action, and the definition of terms. The court may instruct the jury 
concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the court 
and any matter the court in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in 
comprehending the case. 
(b) Interim instructions. During the course of the trial, the court may 
instruct the jury on the law if the instruction will assist the jurors in 
comprehending the case. A party may request an interim instruction. 
(c) Final instructions. The court shall instruct the jury at the conclusion of 
the evidence as may be needed. 
(d) Request for instructions. Parties shall file requested jury instructions 
at the final pretrial conference or at any other time directed by the court. If 
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a party relies on a statute, rule or case to support or object to a requested 
instruction, the party shall provide a citation to or a copy of the statute, rule 
or case. The court shall provide the parties with a copy of the approved 
instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. 
(e) Written instructions. Whenever practical, jury instructions should be 
in writing. At least one written copy shall provided to the jury. The court 
shall provide a written copy to any juror who requests one. 
(f) Objections to instructions. Objections to written instructions shall be 
made before the instructions are given to the jury. Objections to oral 
instructions may be made after they are given to the jury, but before the 
jury retires to consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to 
make objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to 
an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not 
be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In objecting to the 
giving of an instruction, a party shall identify the matter to which the 
objection is made and the grounds for the objection. 
(g) Arguments. Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after 
the court has given the jury its final instructions. The court shall not 
comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the 
evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all 
questions of fact. 
UtahR.Civ.P.51. 
As to the third issue - the summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim -
the determinative rule is Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which reads, in its entirety, as 
follows: 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim 
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after 
the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after 
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for 
summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any 
time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
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(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and 
a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that 
appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the 
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated 
present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court 
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to 
be had or may make such other order as is just. 
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented 
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the 
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the 
affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending 
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
After years of hard-fought, contentious, and expensive litigation, Branson finally 
got his day in court. Following a jury trial that spanned three weeks, the Jury found in 
favor of Branson and against Marvin on, among other things, Branson's claims for 
slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty. The Jury was specifically and properly 
instructed that Branson's attorney fees were recoverable as special damages on those two 
claims. In accordance with those instructions, the Jury specifically awarded Branson his 
fees in response to separate special interrogatories on exactly that issue on the Special 
Verdict Form. 
However, despite the copious evidence in the record supporting the Jury's verdict, 
and in contravention of the law and its own instructions to the Jury, the trial court 
erroneously granted Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
declined to award Branson his attorney fees. The trial court's grant of judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict was reversible error. 
The JNOV Ruling was not the only instance of reversible error by the trial court. 
Prior to trial, the trial court erroneously granted Defendants' motion for partial summary 
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judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution claim against Marvin. The trial court 
based its ruling on the incorrect conclusion that a magistrate's bind over of a criminal 
defendant, standing alone, defeats a subsequent cause of action for malicious prosecution 
by the former criminal defendant. In so ruling, the trial court ignored the controlling and 
directly contrary authority from the Utah Supreme Court and focused incorrectly on the 
wrong party for the probable-cause inquiry. Indeed, the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment is directly at odds with the express and unambiguous precedent of this Court 
and over 100 years of Utah precedent. See, e.g., Hodges v. Gibson, 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 
1991); Johnston v. Meaghr, 14 Utah 426, 47 P. 861, 865 (1897). The trial court's ruling 
is illogical and, if accepted, would effectively eliminate the tort of malicious prosecution. 
Indeed, if the trial court's position were correct, then the more premeditated and robust 
the defendant's false accusation, the more likely that defendant would be to escape 
liability for malicious prosecution. Obviously, that is not the law, and has not been since 
even before Utah was a state. See, e.g., Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 33 P. 224, 226 
(Utah Terr. 1893). 
Accordingly, Branson respectfully requests that the Utah Supreme Court reverse 
the trial court's grant of Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
reverse the trial court's refusal to award to Branson the attorney fees specifically awarded 
by the jury, reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Branson's malicious 
prosecution claim, and remand to the trial court to award Branson his attorney fees and 
hold a trial on the merits regarding Branson's malicious prosecution claim. 
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II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Branson initiated this action on October 29, 2002, asserting claims against Marvin 
for, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty, slander of title, breach of contract, and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See R. 16-18, 21, & 26-27. Later, 
Branson amended his complaint to add causes of action against Marvin for battery and 
malicious prosecution. See R. 3723-24. 
Marvin asserted counterclaims against Branson for, among other things, breach of 
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, battery, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and slander of title. See R. 1609-11 & 1615-17. Other parties and claims, 
which are not relevant to the issues before the Court, were dismissed. 
Before trial, the trial court granted Marvin's motion for partial summary judgment 
on Branson's malicious prosecution claim against Marvin. See R. 8721-22. 
The parties' remaining claims were tried before a jury. See R. 9788-94. On 
February 5, 2007, the Jury in this matter completed its Special Verdict Form and gave 
judgment in favor of Branson on all of Branson's claims against Marvin. See R. 9788-91. 
Also, the Jury found in favor of Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's slander of title 
counterclaim. See R. 9793. The Jury gave judgment in favor of Marvin on his remaining 
counterclaims against Branson, but awarded him a total of $2.00. See R. 9792-94. 
With regard to Branson's slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the 
Jury expressly found under both claims "that Marvin should be held to pay Branson's 
attorney fees." R. 9789-91. The trial court specifically and expressly instructed the Jury 
that if the Jury awarded attorney fees, the judge would determine and award the amount 
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of those fees. See R. 9771 & 9777. In other words, the amount of Branson's fees was 
not submitted to the Jury. 
In contrast to its award of attorney fees to Branson, the Jury expressly declined to 
award Marvin attorney fees. See R. 9792-94. In fact, the Jury declined to award Marvin 
anything more than $2.00, expressly found that Branson did not slander title to Marvin's 
property, and expressly found that even though Branson had breached his fiduciary duty 
to Marvin, Branson should not be held to pay Marvin's attorney fees. See id. 
On June 19, 2007, the trial court granted Marvin's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. SeeR. 10569. 
On July 25, 2008, the trial court entered the final order. See R. 11353. This 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L MATERIAL FACTS REGARDING BRANSON'S FIRST AND SECOND 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A, The Jury Instructions 
At trial, both Branson and Marvin submitted to the Jury causes of action for 
slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty. See R. 9789-91 & 9793-94. The jury 
instructions accurately reflected the law and elements for those claims. See R. 9767 & 
9776-77. To wit, agreement of and without objection from the parties, the following 
instruction was given to the Jury as to both brothers' fiduciary duty claims: 
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INSTRUCTION NO, 3 g 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY DAMAGES 
If either party prevails on his ctaim for breach of fiduciary dirty, he may be 
awarded damages for those losses and injuries proximately caused from the other 
party's breach, including his attorneys fees incurred. 
If you choose to award attorney fees as damages herein, the amount of 
attorney's fees will be determined later by the court. 
R.9771. 
Notably, both parties agreed to the instruction that attorney fees could be awarded 
as damages, but that the amount of such an award would be determined by the trial court. 
See id. 
Further, by agreement of and without objection from the parties, the following 
instruction was given to the Jury as to both brothers' slander of title claims: 
INSTRUCTION NO, £ IT 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
In order to recover for slander of title, a party must prove that: 
(1) The other published a slanderous statement disparaging his title to his 
property; 
(2}The statement was false; 
(3} The statement was made with malice; j 
{4} The statement proximately caosi? anjf actual or specific damage. 
{5} A scandalous statement was published, or recorded, or notcuredA 
disparaging the other's title. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ? 
SUNDER OF TITLE 
DEFINITION - ACTUAL OR SPECIAL DAMAGES 
In order to prevail on his slander of title claim, the party must prove that he 
suffered actual or special damages. This requires that the party establish that he has 
Incurred pecuniary loss that has been realized or liquidated, Usually, this involves 
demonstrating a safe of the property ^ a reduced price or at greater expense to the 
seller. It is not sufficient, however, for the party to show ttiat f ie land's value has 
dropped on the market, as such woufd not constitute a realized or liquidated loss to the 
party • Attomey fees may be recoverable as special damages If Incurred to clear title, 
or to undo any harm created by whatever slander of title actually occurred. 
R. 9776-77. 
Again, it is noteworthy that both parties agreed to the instruction that attorney fees 
could be awarded as damages, but that the amount of such an award would be determined 
by the trial court. See id. 
B. The Jury's Verdict 
In the Special Verdict Form, the Jury found for Branson and against Marvin on 
Branson's slander of title claim, and specifically awarded Branson his attorney fees. See 
R. 9789-90. Also, the Jury found for Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's slander of 
title claim, and thus, did not award Marvin any damages or attorney fees. See R. 9793. 
The Jury found for Branson and against Marvin on Branson's breach of fiduciary duty 
claim, and specifically awarded Branson his attorney fees. SeeR.9790-91. Again, the 
Jury expressly declined to award Marvin any damages or attorney fees for his breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. See R. 9793-94. As declared by the Jury's Foreperson: 
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a. "The Jury specifically and intentionally awarded Branson his 
attorney fees as part of his damages." R. 10556. 
b. "The Jury believed it was making Branson whole by awarding him 
his attorney fees." id. 
c. "The [trial court] instructed the Jury not to calculate Branson's 
attorney fees because the [trial court] would calculate them after our verdict." R. 
10557. 
d. "The Jury specifically and intentionally declined to award Marvin 
any attorney fees because Marvin lost and we did not think Marvin was entitled to 
his attorney fees as damages." Id. 
e. "In the end, Branson was the winner of the Trial. This was why we 
awarded Branson . . . his attorney fees as damages for the slander of title and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims." R. 10557-58. 
Despite the Jury's verdict, the trial court granted Marvin's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, concluding "as a matter of law that the jury failed to follow 
the [trial court]'s instructions, regarding the Special Verdict and instructions 6C and 8C." 
R. 10566. 
C. The Evidence Adduced at Trial Regarding Damages Suffered by 
Branson Relating to His Slander of Title and Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Claims 
At trial, the following evidence was admitted, which supported the Jury's award of 
attorney fees to Branson on his slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims: 
12 
L Formation of the Partnership 
In or about 1962, Branson and his father started a construction company called 
B.B. Neff & Sons. See R. 11485 at 6. At that time, Branson's brother, Marvin, was 
approximately 11 years old. See id. at 11. 
In or about 1967, Branson acquired a farm in Corrine, Utah (the "Farm"). See R. 
11485 at 6-14. Branson used the Farm as collateral for construction bonding, a necessity 
for licensure. See id. at 23-25. 
In or about 1970, Branson invited Marvin to join him in the construction business. 
See id. at 18-19. However, Marvin did not become partners with Branson until in or 
about 1975, when they started ABCO Construction, Inc. ("ABCO"). See id. at 19. 
Branson contributed machinery, equipment, and use of the Farm for bonding. See id. at 
22-23. The brothers had a 'handshake deal' with respect to ABCO until 1982, when they 
signed a partnership agreement. See id. at 20-21; R. 11488 at 582-83. 
In or about 1983, Branson gave Marvin approximately one acre from the Farm on 
which to build a home. See R. 11485 at 28-30. Branson also built his home on a 
different one-acre portion of the Farm. See id. at 30 & 33. 
2. The Asset-Protection Work 
In or about 1998, Branson and Marvin hired an attorney, Travis Bowen 
("Bowen"), to perform some asset-protection work. See id. at 60-61; R. 11487 at 406. 
3. The Buyout 
Shortly after the asset-protection work was completed, Branson began to discover 
Marvin's breaches of fiduciary duty. See R. 11486 at 63-64. Among other things, 
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Marvin embezzled money from ABCO and refused Branson access to ABCO's books 
and records. See id. at 136-37, 142, & 166. As a result of those discoveries, Branson 
realized the need to disassociate with Marvin. See id. 
In or about April 1999, Branson again hired Bowen to organize a new company 
called Big Sky Contracting ("Big Sky"). See id. at 63-64. Branson is the sole owner of 
Big Sky. See id. at 66. 
In the latter part of 1999, Branson and Marvin began discussions regarding Marvin 
buying out Branson's interest in ABCO. See id. at 67. Branson and Marvin again hired 
Bowen to assist with the buyout. See id. at 69; R. 11487 at 413. 
Marvin and Branson could not agree on the value of ABCO for the purposes of the 
buyout. See R. 11486 at 69-70. As an outline for the buyout, Branson and Marvin signed 
a one-page document titled "Property Settlement," on or about December 8, 1999. See 
id. at 88-90 & 100-01. 
(a) The Farm and Branson's Home 
As part of the buyout agreement, Branson and Marvin agreed that Branson would 
keep the Farm, on which stood Branson's home, which Branson built himself. See id. at 
83, 94, & 149-51. 
To facilitate the buyout process, Bowen created partnerships for assets to pass into 
for subsequent distribution. See id. at 122-23 & 148; R. 11487 at 435-36, 438, & 456-62. 
Branson signed the deeds necessary to transfer title to the Farm to one of these pass-
through partnerships, after being assured that the deeds would not be recorded until the 
remaining buyout documents were completed. See R. 11486 at 148-50; R. 11487 at 443 
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& 445-46. However, in contravention of that plan, and without Branson or Bowen's 
permission, Marvin took the Farm deeds from Bowen's office and personally recorded 
them such that Branson had no record ownership in the Farm, or even in his own home. 
SeeR. 11486 at 163-64. 
During more than four years of contentious and expensive litigation, Marvin 
refused to return title to the Farm to Branson, despite the parties' agreement, Bowen's 
instructions, and Branson's pleading. See id at 113, 148-50, 174-75, 177, 182-83, 185, 
192-94, & 227-28; R. 11487 at 429, 446-48, 462-64, & 468-73; R. 11489 at 805 & 839-
42. For instance, Marvin refused to respond to the following letter from Branson: 
While I was in the hospital, I kept thinking that it should be you who 
was administering blessings, it should have been you my wife could call in 
an emergency. You are my only brother and closest family. When our pipe 
broke, it should have been you that we called and paid your restoration 
company to come and fix the mess. Our situation is the pits. Life is too 
short. 
When I came near to cashing it in and it came too close, my dear 
wife would have been left with nothing. Because of the deeds, she has 
nothing for collateral nothing to refinance or sell. It is the pits. 
If you were to cash it in, Alice would be left with ABCO assets, 
Steelwater assets, Aspen Springs and personal property gathered up by you 
two over the years. Quite a difference. It's the pits. 
Reading all the letters from Evelyn's situation, our family does not 
need another mess. Life is too short. We need our house and farm. Go on 
a mission? Nothing to finance it with. Life is too short. 
To phrase an old quote, my get-up-and-go has got up and went. My 
life — life is too short and getting shorter. We would appreciate your 
putting the deeds back in our name. My wife does not need this kind of 
stress. At her age, she should be quilting and enjoying grandchildren, not 
still working to make certain we have a future. 
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R. 11486 at 192-94 (emphases added). Marvin refused even to respond to Branson's 
inquiries regarding the deeds, or send Branson tax notices on the Farm so that Branson 
could pay property taxes. See id. at 158, 167, 175, 183, & 186-87. In fact, in March 
2000, Marvin physically assaulted Branson, when Branson confronted Marvin about is 
refusal to honor the buyout. See id. at 126-28. 
As another example, Marvin refused to return Branson's Farm and home to 
Branson, despite Bowen's warning to Marvin that his conduct may be criminal. See R. 
11487 at 472. 
Marvin also refused to transfer the Farm's attendant water rights to Branson. See 
R. 11486 at 195-98. 
The Jury found Marvin's excuses for slandering title to Branson's real property 
not credible. See R. 9789-90. Those excuses included claims that Bowen's office had 
forged his signature on an ineffective deed, that it was pure coincidence that Marvin 
removed his slander of title the same day Branson removed a lis pendens related to this 
action, that Marvin's conduct was a simple mistake, and the claim that Branson 
threatened him to prevent Marvin from correcting the slander. See R. 11489 at 844, 852, 
854-56, 858-59, 862-63, & 996-97. 
As a result of Marvin's refusal to transfer title to the Farm back to him, Branson 
incurred damages. See R. 11486 at 177-78; R. 11489 at 947-53 & 957-63. For instance, 
Branson was unable to use the Farm for collateral to start his own construction company. 
See R. 11486 at 177-78. Furthermore, Branson incurred attorney fees and costs to have 
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title to the Farm restored, which occurred during the pendency of this action. See R. 
9796-10184, 10343-77, 10386-535, 10378-85, & 11486 at 207-08. 
(b) Continued Work 
Branson and Marvin's buyout agreement also included a provision whereby 
Branson would continue to work as desired for ABCO for payment. See R. 11486 at 85-
86, & 100; R. 11488 at 568-69. However, Marvin refused to allow Branson to work for 
ABCO. See R. 11486 at 136-38. Moreover, Marvin obtained a protective order against 
Branson on false pretenses, so that Branson could not work for ABCO. See id. at 136-38. 
(c) Health Insurance 
Additionally, Branson and Marvin agreed that Branson would be provided health 
insurance through ABCO until he was 65 years old - when Medicare would take over. 
See id. at 85 & 91; R. 11487 at 432. Health insurance was of critical importance to 
Branson because he had diabetes and heart problems and was uninsurable. See R. 11486 
at 85-91; R. 11487 at 432; R. 11488 at 524-31. 
When Branson was 63 years old and in the hospital Marvin attempted to cancel 
Branson's insurance. See R. 11486 at 169-70 & 179-80. Moreover, because Marvin had 
refused to pay Branson the monies owed to him under the buyout agreement, Branson 
lacked the funds to pay for health insurance on his own. See id. at 170. Branson was 
understandably scared and went without medical insurance for six months. See id. at 171 
&319;R. 11488 at 567. 
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(d) Life Insurance Policy 
Branson and Marvin agreed that Marvin would purchase Branson's life insurance 
policy and pay Branson the cash value of the same. See R. 11486 at 99. Branson 
transferred the policy, but Marvin refused to pay Branson for nearly two years and not 
until Branson filed this lawsuit. See id. at 99-100, 131-34, 140, 187-89, & 208; R. 11488 
at 567-68. When Branson confronted Marvin about Marvin's failure to pay the monies 
owed to Branson, Marvin called the police, falsely claiming Branson had hit him. See R. 
11486 at 136-138. 
(e) Equipment and Tools 
Also part of the buyout agreement, Branson and Marvin agreed that Branson could 
use ABCO tools for, among other things, Big Sky. See id. at 73-74 & 92-93. However, 
Marvin refused to honor that provision as well and thereby prevented Branson from 
conducting other work. See id. at 152-54, 155-57, 164, & 172-74. Some of the ABCO 
tools were those that Branson personally contributed when he founded ABCO. See id. at 
157-58. 
When Marvin finally delivered some, but not all of the tools to Branson, they were 
in substantially worse condition then when the parties signed the one-page buyout 
agreement, despite Marvin's agreement to maintain the same. See id. at 210-15; R. 
11487 at 315. 
(f) Improper Deductions 
Rather than pay Branson under the terms of the buyout agreement, Marvin 
deducted not-agreed-to sums from what he owed Branson. For instance, Marvin reduced 
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Branson's payment by $525, for purportedly cleaning Branson's desk; however, Branson 
had taken already his desk with him. See R. 11486 at 200-03. 
(g) Marvin Forced Branson to File a Lawsuit 
Marvin rebuffed Branson's attempts to resolve their dispute without court action. 
See id. at 138-39, 144-47, 152-55, 158-68, 171, & 192-93. In response, Marvin not only 
refused to even attempt to resolve the disputes, he also impugned Branson's character at 
their shared church by stating falsehoods, such as by telling others that Branson beat his 
wife and that Branson was a liar. See id. at 143 & 168. 
(h) Branson's Damages 
Marvin's breaches of fiduciary duty damaged Branson by, among other things, 
causing him to incur attorney fees and costs to remedy those breaches. See R. 9796-
10184, 10343-77, 10386-535, & 10378-85; R. 11486 at 237-39, 250-52, 274, & 281-84; 
R. 11487 at 289-92, 296, 301-302, & 317-19. 
II. MATERIAL FACTS REGARDING BRANSON'S THIRD ISSUE ON 
APPEAL 
A. Branson Vis-a-Vis Marvin 
Branson is thirteen years senior to his brother Marvin. See R. 7942; R. 11485 at 5. 
At the relevant time, Branson was in his late sixties and in poor health, including 
suffering from diabetes. R. 7120, 7123, & 7942. Marvin is in good health, and for 
example, would regularly jog in front of the brothers' homes in Corinne, Utah. See R. 
7942. 
19 
B. Marvin's Assault on Branson on January 26, 2005 
On January 26, 2005, at about 10:00 p.m., Branson was driving home from a class 
in Salt Lake City, and drove past Marvin's house to see if a new neighbor had moved into 
a mobile home located on property at the end of the street. See R. 3709, 7943, & 11489. 
Branson turned around and began driving back to his house. See R. 3209, 7943, & 
11489. Branson saw someone standing in the road, and so slowed down. See R. 3709, 
7124, 7944, & 11490. When Branson saw that it was Marvin, Branson began to speed 
up, to drive past and away from Marvin. See R. 3709, 7124, & 7944. Marvin then 
waived for Branson to stop. Branson stopped and backed up, and asked Marvin "What 
do you need?" because Branson was concerned that there was some sort of emergency, 
and that was why Marvin was waving him down. See id. 
Marvin approached the car and began arguing with Branson, accusing him of 
various misdeeds. See id. While Branson was sitting in his truck, seat belted in, Marvin 
twice hit Branson with his fist - once in the ear and once in the shoulder - and tried to hit 
Branson a third time. See id. Branson stepped on the accelerator to escape Marvin's 
assault. See id. 
As Branson began to accelerate away, Marvin latched on to the truck's steering 
wheel, trying to pull the truck over. See id. Then, Marvin said "Branson, stop, you're 
going to kill me." See id. Branson stopped the truck and Marvin let go of the unlatched 
himself from the truck. See id. 
After turning around to make sure Marvin was not injured and seeing Marvin up 
and walking, Branson then continued into his own driveway. See id. When Branson 
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entered his house, his ear was split and bleeding down the side of his face and shoulder. 
See id. 
C. Neighbor Maurice Carter Witnesses the January 26, 2005 Incident and 
Marvin's Manufacture of Evidence 
Unbeknownst to Marvin at the time, a mutual neighbor of the brothers, Maurice 
Carter ("Carter"), was watching through his window. See R. 7945 & 11490. Carter has 
been a resident of Corinne for over 40 years. His home is situated between the homes of 
Branson and Marvin, but on the opposite side of the road. See R. 7945 & 11489. 
Carter has known Branson, Marvin, and their families the entire time they have 
lived in Corinne. See id. In addition, Carter attends the same ward, and has seen the 
brothers over the years at neighborhood, social, and religious functions. See id. 
On the night of January 26, 2005, Carter noticed that Branson's truck was behind 
him, coming up the road south of Marvin's house. See id. From his driveway, Carter 
saw Branson's truck stop, and saw Marvin approach Branson's truck and Marvin start 
talking to Branson. See id. Carter could see the headlights of the truck, and Marvin was 
standing next to the truck on the driver's side, talking to Branson. See id. 
Carter figured everything was all right and went into the house. See R. 7946 & 
11489. A short time later, Carter was alerted by his wife that Branson had "taken off up 
the road. See id. Carter went to his bedroom window, which looks out directly on the 
road running in front of his house and the brothers' houses. See R. 7946 & 11490. 
When Carter observed Marvin walking down the road, Marvin did not appear 
injured, and was not limping. See id. Marvin then laid face down prone in the road near 
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Carter's mailbox, got up, walked a short distance, then again laid face down prone in the 
road. See id. Marvin then got up walked to the side of the road and shuffled around in 
the gravel, and then walked quickly back to his house. See id. Again, Marvin did not 
appear injured and was not limping. See id. 
A short time later, a highway patrol car entered Branson's driveway. See id. The 
following day, Marvin pretended to be injured. See id. Based on Marvin's statements to 
the Sheriff, Branson was charged with, among other crimes, aggravated assault and threat 
against life or property. See R. 7151-58. 
Marvin's purpose in initiating these criminal proceedings was to injure Branson by 
besmirching Branson's reputation and undermining his credibility in the underlying civil 
proceedings in this case. See R. 3709-11. 
D. Marvin's Attempt to Tamper With a Witness in a Criminal Proceeding 
By a Telephone Call to Carter on November 6, 2005 
On the evening of November 6, 2005, Carter received a telephone call from 
Marvin. See R. 7949 & 11491. Marvin asked if Carter was going to be at the hearing on 
Branson's protective order, scheduled for the next day, November 7, 2005. See id. At 
first, "Marvin tried to convince [Carter] not to go to the hearing, telling [him] that it was 
not important that [he] go, and [he] should just stay out of i t " Id. "[Carter] told Marvin 
[he] was going to go because [he] had been asked to go by Branson's attorneys." Id. "At 
that point, Marvin became agitated and made threatening statements towards [Carter]. 
[Carter] did not appreciate these statements, and it was clear to [him] that Marvin was 
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trying to intimidate [him] into not going to Branson's hearing." R. 7949 & 11492 
(emphases added). 
E. Marvin's Verbal Assault Upon the Witnesses at the Court Hearing of 
November 7, 2005 
At the conclusion of a hearing held on November 8, 2005, Marvin confronted a 
group of community members who had appeared at a hearing, related to the claims 
Marvin had filed against Branson over the January 26, 2005 incident. See id. 
After the hearing, as Carter was leaving the courthouse, he saw Marvin talking 
loudly to a group of the community members who had appeared at the hearing to support 
Branson. See R. 7950 & 11492. When Carter approached the group, "Marvin was highly 
agitated and calling them traitors." Id. 
F. The Prosecutor's Voluntary Dismissal of the Assault Charge Against 
Branson 
At her own initiative, the prosecutor dismissed the charges relating to the January 
26, 2005 incident. See R. 7151-58. 
Despite the above-listed evidence in the record, the trial court granted summary 
judgment against Branson on his malicious prosecution claim, ruling that "the finding of 
probable cause by the magistrate in the Plaintiffs criminal proceeding is dispositive," 
and, by construing the facts against Branson, ruling that "the malice element" was not 
sufficiently supported by evidence. R. 8721-22. Paradoxically, however, the trial court 
often cited to the ill will between the brothers to justify its rulings. See R. 11351-52. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error when it granted Marvin's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, as a result, declined to award Branson the 
attorney fees awarded to him by the Jury. The trial court also committed reversible error 
when it granted Marvin's motion for partial summary judgment on Branson's malicious 
prosecution claim. 
With respect to the first and second issues on appeal, the trial court erred in 
granting Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for at least three 
reasons. First, the Jury specifically, expressly, and properly awarded Branson his 
attorney fees as special damages for his slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty 
claims. Second, Marvin wholly failed to satisfy his requirement to marshal the evidence 
supporting the Jury's verdict. Third, evidence in the record amply supported the Jury's 
verdict. The trial court put the cart before the ox by ruling that Branson suffered no 
damages before accounting for the special damages awarded by the Jury. A trial court 
would not second-guess such a jury finding if the category of damages were something 
like "lost profits"; the fact that the measure of damages has the name "attorney fees" does 
not alter the analysis. 
On the third and final issue on appeal, the trial court erred in granting Marvin's 
motion for summary judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution claim because the 
trial court misconstrued applicable law, and because numerous disputed issues of material 
fact precluded the entry of summary judgment. 
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Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court should reverse the trial court's grant of 
Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reverse the trial court's 
rejection of the Jury's express award to Branson of his attorney fees as special damages 
(which rejection was premised upon the JNOV Ruling), reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution claim, and remand to the trial 
court to award Branson his attorney fees and hold a trial on the merits regarding 
Branson's malicious prosecution claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED MARVIN'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling on Marvin's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict 
The trial court granted Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
on the basis that "as a matter of law that the jury failed to follow the [trial court]'s 
instructions, regarding the Special Verdict and instructions 6C and 8C." R. 10566. In so 
ruling, the trial court improperly interpreted the Jury's verdict contrary to the clearly 
expressed intent of the Jury as denoted by the Jury on the Special Verdict Form. That 
ruling by the trial court was reversible error. 
B. Standard 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict for correctness, viewing all facts and inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and affording the trial court 
no deference. See, e.g., Walker v. Parish Chem. Co., 914 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah 1996). 
25 
This Court must reverse the trial court's grant of Marvin's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict unless, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in 
the light most favorable to Branson, the Court concludes that there is "no competent 
evidence which would support" the Jury's verdicts in favor of Branson. See DeBry v. 
Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
A directed verdict and a judgment n.o.v. are justified only if, after 
looking at the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, "the trial court concludes that there is no 
competent evidence which would support a verdict in his favor." 
Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982); Hansen v. Stewart, 
761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988); Mel Hardman Prods., Inc. v. Robinson, 604 
P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979); Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 
1979); McCloudv. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977). A motion 
should be denied '"H)f reasonable persons could reach differing 
conclusions on the issue in controversy.'" Kilpack, 604 P.2d at 463 
(quoting McCloud, 569 P.2d at 1127); Management Comm. of Gray stone 
Pine Homeowners Ass'n v. Gray stone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 
(Utah 1982). 
Id. (alteration in original) (emphases added). Under that standard, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Marvin's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict 
The Jury specifically and expressly awarded Branson his attorney fees not once, 
but twice, under the following two, independent causes of action: (1) slander of title and 
(2) breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court erred by declining to follow the Jury's 
verdict awarding Branson his attorney fees, for at least the following three reasons. 
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1. The Law and Jury Instructions Support the Jury's Verdict 
The law and instructions given to the Jury support the Jury's verdict awarding 
attorney fees to Branson on his successful slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty 
claims against Marvin. In fact, the parties were in agreement as to the applicable law and 
the form of the jury instructions. To recap, however, a discussion follows. 
It is well settled that a party may recover, as special damages, their attorney fees 
and costs incurred curing a slander of title. See Bass v. Planned Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 761 
P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1998) ("Attorney fees have been held to be recoverable as special 
damages if incurred to remove a cloud placed by the defendant on the title."); Dowse v. 
Doris Trust Co., 116 Utah 106, 208 P.2d 956, 959 (1949) ('The action of slander of title 
is based on a wrongful act but for which the plaintiff would not have had to incur any 
expense, either for costs or for attorney's fees."). Thus, as a matter of law, Branson's 
attorney fees were a proper measure of recoverable special damages for his successful 
slander of title claim against Marvin. In other words, the fees were the actual damages 
awarded to Branson, unlike, for example, attorney fees awarded by a trial court on the 
judge's determination of prevailing party status. 
In accordance with the rule of law stated above, the Jury in this case was 
instructed, without any objection, that attorney fees were special damages of a slander of 
title action, and that the trial court, not the Jury, would determine the amount of 
Branson's attorney fees. R. 9771 ("If you chose to award attorney's fees as damages 
herein, the amount of the attorney's fees will be determined later by the court." (emphasis 
added)) & 9777 ("Attorney fees may be recoverable as special damages "). Thus, the 
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Jury was properly instructed on the law that permits attorney fees as special damages on a 
slander of title claim. The fact that the measure of damages is called "attorney fees" 
rather than "lost profits" or "unjust enrichment," for example, does not render the Jury's 
verdict vulnerable. 
It is also well established that a party may recover his attorney fees as special 
damages on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2001 UT 89, f 122, 65 P.3d 1134 ("[BJreach of a fiduciary obligation is a well-
established exception to the American rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases 
generally."), revfdon other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Staffing Am., Inc. v. Advanced 
Mgmt. Concepts, Inc., 2005 UT App 437, 2005 WL 2600637, at *2 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 
14, 2005) {^'Campbell broadly approved the awarding of attorney fees as damages for the 
breach of a fiduciary duty . . . . " ) . Thus, as a matter of law, Branson was entitled to his 
attorney fees as special damages on his successful breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
As with Branson's slander of title claim, the trial court properly instructed the 
Jury, without objection from Marvin, that the trial court, not the Jury, would determine 
the amount of Branson's attorney fees. R. 9771 ("If either party prevails on his claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty, he may be awarded damages for those losses . . . including his 
attorney's fees incurred If you chose to award attorney's fees as damages herein, 
the amount of the attorney's fees will be determined later by the court." (emphases 
added)). Thus, the Jury was properly instructed on the law that permits attorney fees as 
special damages on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
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The trial court erred by failing to follow the Jury's verdict, which was supported 
by law and the jury instructions. 
2. Marvin Failed to Marshal the Evidence Supporting the Jury's 
Verdict 
The Utah Supreme Court should summarily reverse the trial court's grant of 
Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Marvin failed to 
satisfy the requirements of such a motion. Specifically, although Utah law required 
Marvin to "marshal all evidence that supports the verdict," Marvin wholly failed to do so. 
DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added) (affirming 
jury verdict and denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a matter of 
law because moving party failed to marshal all evidence supporting the verdict); see also 
Holmstrom v. CR. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, f 29, 8 P.3d 282 (requiring moving 
party to "marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and then show that the evidence 
cannot support the verdict" (emphases added) (additional quotations and citations 
omitted)). SeeR. 10225. 
Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was similar to that of 
the moving party in DeBry, whose motion was denied. See DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1359. 
Like the moving party in DeBry, Marvin referred only to the evidence that supported his 
argument, rather than calling the trial court's attention to all of the relevant evidence. See 
id. R. 10224-25. Also, in his papers, Marvin reargued the evidence as if his motion was 
a trial de novo, which it was not because the Jury had already made the determination that 
Branson was entitled to his attorney fees. See DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1360. 
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However, unlike the moving party in DeBry, Marvin did not even attempt or 
purport to marshal the evidence supporting the Jury's verdict. See id. Thus, the Court 
can and should reverse the trial court's grant of Marvin's motion on that basis alone. See 
Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("When 
the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid."). Otherwise, the marshalling 
rule is meaningless, and Marvin will be rewarded for not following the rules. 
3. The Evidence and Inferences Drawn Therefrom Support the Jury's 
Verdict 
The evidence admitted at the trial amply supports the Jury's finding that Branson 
incurred attorney fees as special damages for his successful slander of title and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims. 
Branson and Marvin were partners in ABCO. See R. 11485 at 19. Branson owned 
and lived on the Farm, but gave Marvin a one-acre parcel on which to build his home. 
See id. at 22-23, 28-30, & 33. 
In or about 1999, Branson began to discover Marvin's breaches of fiduciary duty. 
See R. 11486 at 63-64. Among other things, Marvin embezzled money from ABCO and 
refused Branson access to ABCO's books and records. See id. at 136-37, 142, & 166. 
As a result of those discoveries, Branson realized the need to disassociate with Marvin. 
On December 8, 1999, Branson and Marvin executed a one-page document to 
facilitate Marvin's purchase of Branson's interest in ABCO. See id. at 67 & 69; R. 11487 
at 413. Marvin and Branson could not agree on the value of ABCO for the purposes of 
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the buyout. See R. 11486 at 69-70. As part of the one-page buyout agreement, Branson 
and Marvin agreed that Branson would keep the Farm, on which stood Branson's home, 
which Branson built himself, along with water rights associated with the Farm. See id. at 
83, 94, & 149-51. However, Marvin purposefully and maliciously divested Branson of 
record title in the Farm and his home. See id. at 163-64. Moreover, during more than 
four years of contentious and expensive litigation, Marvin refused to transfer title to the 
Farm or water rights to Branson. See id. at 113, 148-50, 174-75, 177, 182-83, 185, 193-
98, & 227-28; R. 11487 at 429, 446-48, 462-64, & 468-73; R. 11489 at 805 & 839-42. 
Also in contravention f their agreement, Marvin refused to allow Branson to work 
for ABCO. See id. at 136-38. Moreover, Marvin obtained a protective order against 
Branson on false pretenses, so that Branson could not work for ABCO. See id. at 136-38. 
When Branson was 63 years old and in the hospital Marvin attempted to cancel 
Branson's insurance. See R. 11486 at 169-70, & 179-80. Moreover, because Marvin had 
refused to pay Branson the monies owed to him under the buyout agreement, Branson 
lacked the funds to pay for health insurance on his own. See id. at 170. Health insurance 
was of critical importance to Branson because he had diabetes and heart problems and 
was uninsurable. See R. 11486 at 85-91; R. 11487 at 432; R. 11488 at 524-31. Branson 
was understandably scared and went without medical insurance for six months. See id. at 
171; R. 11487 at 319; R. 11488 at 567. 
Additionally, Marvin refused to pay Branson for a life insurance policy that 
Branson transferred to Marvin as part of the buyout agreement for nearly two years and 
not until Branson filed this lawsuit. See id. at 99-100, 131-34, 140, 187-89, & 208; R. 
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11488 at 567-68. When Branson confronted Marvin about Marvin's failure to pay the 
monies owed to Branson, Marvin called the police falsely claiming Branson had hit him. 
SeeR. 11487 at 136-138. 
Also, Marvin refused to honor a buyout provision that allowed Branson to use 
ABCO tools and thereby prevented Branson from conducting other work. See id. at 152-
54, 155-57, 164, & 172-74. Some of the ABCO tools were those that Branson personally 
contributed when he founded ABCO. See id. at 157-58. When Marvin finally delivered 
some, but not all of the tools to Branson, they were in substantially worse condition than 
when the parties signed the buyout agreement, despite Marvin's agreement to maintain 
the same. See id at 210-15; R. 11487 at 315. 
Rather than pay Branson under the terms of the buyout agreement, Marvin 
deducted not-agreed-to sums from what he owed Branson. For instance, Marvin reduced 
Branson's payment by $525, for purportedly cleaning Branson's desk; however, Branson 
had taken already his desk with him. See R. 11486 at 200-03. 
Testimonial and documentary evidence admitted during the trial revealed that 
Branson incurred attorney fees and costs to cure Marvin's slander of title. For example, 
the evidence demonstrated that Marvin's slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty 
damaged Branson by, among other things, causing him to incur attorney fees to remedy 
Marvin's misdeeds. See R. 9796-10184, 10343-77, 10386-535, & 10378-85; R. 11486 at 
237-39, 250-52, 274, & 281-84; R. 11487 at 289-92, 296, 301-302, & 317-19. 
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n. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DENIED BRANSON'S REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling on Branson's Request for Attorney Fees 
The trial court denied Brandon's request for attorney fees based on its grant of 
Marvin's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See R. 10569. Because the 
trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict was error (as discussed above 
in Section I), so too was its denial of Branson's request for attorney fees.1 
B. Standard 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's denial to award attorney fees premised 
upon judgment notwithstanding the verdict for correctness, viewing all facts and 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and 
affording the trial court no deference. See, e.g., Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f^ 127, 
130 P.3d 325; Walker v. Parish Chem. Co., 914 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah 1996); Keith 
Jorgensen 's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128,111, 26 P.3d 872. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Branson's Request for Attorney 
Fees 
The Jury found in favor of Branson on his slander of title and breach of fiduciary 
duty claims against Marvin and awarded Branson his attorney fees as special damages. 
See R. 9789-91 & 10556-58. It was Branson's constitutional right to have the Jury 
decide that issue. See Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, f 53, 103 P.3d 135 (concluding that 
1
 Additionally, the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to enter sufficiently detailed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in support of its refusal to honor the Jury's verdict awarding Branson his attorney fees. See, 
e.g., Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996) (reiterating rule that ruling on amount of attorney fees 
"must be based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact" (quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 
266,268 (Utah 1992)); Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, % 9, 984 P.2d 392 (same). 
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it is "clear that the constitutional right to a jury trial fully included the jury's 
determination of damages"). If this Court reverses the trial court's grant of judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (which it should), then Branson is entitled to his attorney fees 
and costs. 
The trial court appears to have improperly conducted a prevailing party analysis. 
That analysis was inappropriate because the Jury specifically awarded Branson his 
attorney fees as damages. See id. Damages are a question of fact for the Jury. Seey e.g., 
id. at \ 34 (noting that "damages are a question of fact, and . . . questions of fact are 
distinctly within the jury's province"); Sohm v. Dixie Eye Ctr., 2007 UT App 235, ^ f 22, 
166 P.3d 614 (reversing trial court and concluding that "issues regarding damages present 
questions of fact, which should be resolved by a jury"). "This is a long-standing 
principle in Utah case law." Sohm, 2007 UT App 235 at f 18. 
The Jury's damages award cannot be set aside absent extraordinary circumstances 
- a finding that "no competent evidence exists which would support" the Jury's verdicts 
in favor of Branson. DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994) 
(emphasis added). As detailed above, the Jury's verdict was plenteously supported by 
competent evidence. In other words, Branson has a constitutional right to the Jury's 
award of his fees as damages. See Judd, 2004 UT 91 at \ 53. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED MARVIN'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BRANSON'S MALICIOUS 
PROSECUTION CLAIM 
A, The Trial Court's Ruling on Branson's Malicious Prosecution Claim 
The trial court granted Marvin's motion for partial summary judgment on 
Branson's malicious prosecution claim on the following two bases: (1) "the finding of 
probable cause by the magistrate in the Plaintiffs criminal proceeding is dispositive/' 
and (2) "the malice element" was not sufficiently supported by evidence. See R. 8721-
22. The trial court's ruling is contrary to established Utah law and the evidence in the 
record. 
B. Standard 
Summary judgment is not appropriate unless "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgment procedure is generally considered a drastic 
remedy, requiring strict compliance with [Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56]." Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993). For this reason, a court must accept "all 
facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 
UT 42, f 20, 48 P.3d 941 (emphasis added); Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass *n v. 
Wasatch County, 2001 UT App 414,120, 40 P.3d 1148 (same). Moreover, "the court 
does not judge the credibility of the claims or the witnesses or the weight of the 
evidence." Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 429 (Utah 1990); see also Trujillo v. Utah 
Dept. of Trans., 1999 UT App 227,142, 986 P.2d 752 ("Trial courts must avoid 
weighing evidence and assessing credibility when ruling on motions for summary 
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judgment."). "A single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact." Webster 
v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); see also Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 
1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("One sworn statement under oath [involving a material fact] 
is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary judgment." 
(alteration in original)). 
In sum, these rules create a substantial burden on litigants because summary 
judgment prevents parties from fully presenting their case to the court, and so courts are, 
and should be, reluctant to invoke this drastic remedy. See Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 
620, 623 (Utah 1974) ("Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and the courts should be 
reluctant to deprive litigants of an opportunity to fully present their contentions upon a 
trial."). 
C. The Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment on Branson's 
Malicious Prosecution Claim Was Error 
1. Elements of Malicious Prosecution 
The definitive Utah case on the elements of malicious prosecution is Hodges v. 
Gibson, 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court defined the four 
elements of the tort of malicious prosecution as follows: 
(1) defendants initiated or procured the initiation of criminal proceedings 
against an innocent plaintiff; (2) defendants did not have probable cause to 
initiate the prosecution; (3) defendants initiated the proceedings primarily 
for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice; and (4) the 
proceedings terminated in favor of the accused. See Kennedy v. Burbidge, 
54 Utah 497, 500-01, 183 P. 325, 326 (Utah 1919); Callioux v. Progressive 
Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct.App.1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 653 (1977); see also W. Keeton, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 119, at 871 (5th ed. 1984). 
Id. at 156 (emphases added). 
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2. The Trial Court Grossly Misconstrued the Probable Cause Element 
The trial court ruled that, because the criminal magistrate found probable cause in 
the bindover setting, Branson's malicious prosecution claim was barred as a matter of 
law. That ruling is incorrect, for several reasons. 
First, the Utah Supreme Court's elucidation of elements of the tort of malicious 
prosecution contradicts the trial court's ruling. Malicious prosecution plainly requires a 
showing that the malicious prosecution defendant (the accuser in the criminal case) did 
not have probable cause to initiate the criminal prosecution. Id. at 156 (requiring, among 
other things, a showing that civil "defendant^ did not have probable cause to initiate the 
prosecution" (emphases added)). The Utah Supreme Court reinforced this focus on the 
civil defendant's belief and knowledge, stating: 
An accusation leading to the initiation of a criminal prosecution 
must be based on probable cause determined as of the time the action was 
filed. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 662 comment e (1977). The 
accuser must have sufficient information based on an adequate 
investigation to justify the conclusion that there is probable cause to initiate 
a criminal proceeding. See Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 
Utah 2d 133, 135, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960). The accuser must have a 
reasonable basis for believing the accusation and must also subjectively 
believe the accusation to be true. See Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah 208, 
218, 241 P. 309, 312 (1925); McKenzie v. Canning, 42 Utah 529, 530-31, 
131 P. 1172, 1172-73 (1913); Wright v. Ascheim, 5 Utah 480, 491, 17 P. 
125,131(1888). 
Id. at 158 (emphases added) (internal footnote omitted). Thus, the trial court 
incorrectly shifted the subject of the probable cause inquiry from Marvin to the 
criminal magistrate. 
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Second, the criminal magistrate's bindover inquiry did not deal with the state of 
mind of Marvin, but rather the evidence presented by the prosecution without evaluation 
of credibility. Indeed the bindover is intentionally incredibly low. See, e.g., State v. 
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, \ 21, 137 P.3d 787 ("The bindover standard is intended to leave the 
principal fact finding to the jury"); State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, % 9, 198 P.3d 471 
("The bindover standard is intentionally low so that the credibility of witnesses and the 
truthfulness of the facts are left to the fact-finder."). Thus, even if the bindover standard 
is met, probable cause in the context of a civil malicious prosecution action is not 
necessarily met because it is a different inquiry. Moreover, at her own initiative, the 
prosecutor dismissed the charges against Branson. See R. 7151-58. Thus, the criminal 
magistrate's bindover has no preclusive effect on Branson's malicious prosecution claim. 
Third, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly rejected the trial court's ruling in Olson 
v. Independent Order of Foresters, 324 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1958), opining that: 
There can be no doubt that proof of fraud, perjury or other undue means in 
procuring a magistrate to bind over a plaintiff in an action for malicious 
prosecution would overcome any presumption of probable cause for such 
binding over, but it does not follow that the absence of such evidence 
makes the binding over by a magistrate conclusive evidence of probable 
cause. 
Id. at 1013 (emphases added). Thus, the trial court's logic would fail even if there was no 
evidence of fraud, perjury, etc. by Marvin, but the conclusion is all the easier in the face 
of the overwhelming evidence that Marvin lied to the criminal authorities. The trial court 
was required to construe that evidence in Branson' favor, which it obviously did not. 
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More recently, in Hodges, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a malicious 
prosecution judgment in favor or the plaintiff, where the plaintiff had been "bound over 
for a t r ial . . . [fjollowing a preliminary hearing," necessarily based on the magistrate's 
finding of probable cause to believe that the criminal defendant / malicious-prosecution 
plaintiff committed the alleged crime. Hodges v. Gibson, 811 P.2d at 155. Thus, the 
criminal magistrate's bindover of the criminal matter is no impediment to Branson's 
malicious prosecution claim. 
Moreover, the relevant facts of Hodges resemble the facts of the instant case. The 
plaintiff in Hodges was charged with a crime. See id. "Following a preliminary hearing, 
[the plaintiff] was bound over for a t r i a l . . . . " Id. "Before [the plaintiff]'s trial could be 
held," the prosecutor "dismissed the . . . charge against [the plaintiff]." Id. The plaintiff 
in Hodges then filed a civil action against his accusers for malicious prosecution, among 
other things. See id. The jury found the accusers "liable for malicious prosecution" and 
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiff. Id. The accusers 
appealed. Id. Affirming the jury's malicious prosecution verdict against the accusers, the 
Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected one of the civil defendant's arguments "that its 
conduct was vindicated" by the filing of the criminal prosecution in the first instance. Id. 
at 160. 
Here, as in Hodges, Marvin called law enforcement and falsely accused Branson 
of a crime. Despite his protestations of innocence, Branson was charged. Branson's 
criminal matter was bound over, following a preliminary hearing. Also, prior to trial of 
the criminal matter, the prosecutor dismissed the charge on her own motion. Thus, just as 
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the Utah Supreme Court did in Hodges, this Court should reject the trial court's ruling 
that Marvin's conduct was vindicated by the criminal bindover. 
Finally, the trial court's ruling is illogical and, if accepted, would effectively 
eliminate the tort of malicious prosecution, which has been recognized in Utah since 
before it was a state. See, e.g., Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 33 P. 224, 226 (Utah Terr. 
1893) (recognizing action for malicious prosecution). 
Indeed, if the trial court's ruling were correct, then the more premeditated and 
robust the lie supporting a false charge of criminal conduct, the more likely a false 
accuser would escape liability for malicious prosecution. Because that well orchestrated, 
yet false claim would be more likely to result in a bindover. Such cannot be the law. 
3. Sufficient Evidence Was in the Record to Survive Marvin's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
The trial court also anchored its grant of summary judgment against Branson on 
his malicious prosecution claim on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the "malice" element his claim - "defendants initiated the proceedings primarily 
for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." Id at 156. As with its 
first basis for entry of partial summary judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution 
claim, the trial court's second basis is incorrect. 
Although only a single sworn statement would have been fatal to Marvin's 
motion, when the trial court granted summary judgment, there was substantial evidence 
in the record supporting the malice element. To wit, the following evidence was offered 
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to support Branson's allegation that Marvin initiated the criminal matter primarily for a 
purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice: 
The Events of January 26, 2005 
• Marvin signaled to Branson to pull over his automobile. See R. 
3709, 7124, & 7944. 
• Marvin approached Branson's automobile and Marvin initiated a 
verbal argument with Branson. See id. 
• While Branson was sitting in his automobile, seat belted in, Marvin 
began punching Branson in the head and body, splitting Branson's ear and 
causing Branson to bleed down his face and shoulder. See id. 
• Branson tried to escape Marvin's punches, but Marvin grabbed the 
automobile's steering wheel and attempted to steer the automobile off the 
road. See id. 
• When Marvin asked Branson to stop, Branson stopped his 
automobile. See id. 
• After checking to make sure Marvin was not injured, Branson drove 
home. See id. 
• After Branson left the scene to drive home, Carter observed Marvin 
walking down the road uninjured. See R. 7946 & 11490. 
• To make himself appear injured for law enforcement, Marvin then 
laid face down prone in the road near Mr. Carter's mailbox, got up, walked 
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a short distance, then again laid face down prone in the road. Marvin then 
got up walked to the side of the road and shuffled around in the gravel, and 
then walked quickly back to his house. Again, he did not appear injured 
and was not limping. See id. 
• The following day, Marvin pretended to be injured for law 
enforcement. See id. 
• Based on Marvin's statements to the Sheriff, Branson was charged 
with, among other crimes, aggravated assault and threat against life or 
property. See R. 7151-58. 
Marvin's Attempted Witness Tampering 
• The night before a hearing related to the above-described incident, 
Marvin told Carter not to testify in Branson's defense. See R. 7949 & 
11491. When Carter indicated that he would attend the hearing, Marvin 
became agitated and threatened Carter. See id. 
• Carter perceived Marvin's statements as an attempt to intimidate him 
so as to discourage Carter's testimony. See R. 7949 & 11492. 
Marvin's Verbal Assault on Community Members 
• After the hearing, Marvin confronted a group of community 
members who had appeared in support of Branson. See R. 7950 & 11492. 
Marvin was highly agitated and calling them traitors. See id. 
42 
Other Evidence of Marvin's Malice 
• Marvin procured the initiation of the criminal proceeding during the 
pendency of this hard-fought and contentious civil case. See R. 7151-58. 
• Marvin refused to release the Farm and Branson's home, despite 
Bowen's admonition that Marvin's conduct may be criminal, the parties' 
agreement, and Branson's importuning. See R. 11486 at 113, 148-50, 174-
75, 177, 182-83, 185, 192-94, & 227-28; R. 11487 at 429, 446-48, 462-64, 
& 468-73; R. 11489 at 805 & 839-42. 
• Marvin attempted to terminate Branson's health insurance, while 
Branson was in poor health. See R. 11486 at 169-71, 179-80, & 319; R. 
11488 at 567. 
Interpreting this evidence and all inferences in the light most favorable to Branson, 
as this Court must, there was significant evidence in the record to support the malice 
element of his malicious prosecution claim against Marvin. Thus, the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Marvin on Branson's malicious prosecution 
claim. This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling and remand Branson's malicious 
prosecution claim for trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, the Utah Supreme Court should reverse the trial 
court's grant of Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reverse the 
trial court's denial of Branson's attorney fees specifically and expressly awarded by the 
Jury, reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Branson's malicious 
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prosecution claim, and remand to the trial court to award Branson his attorney fees and 
hold a trial on the merits regarding Branson's malicious prosecution claim. 
DATED this 10th day of July 2009. 
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